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Abstract 
This paper extends the literature on collective rent-seeking by introducing the possibility 
that a competing group may be a subset of another. We develop a model that 
incorporates the potential for some individuals to be party of both sides of a conflict, 
which creates interdependence of payoffs. Results indicate that strategic individual 
behavior, and the resulting rent dissipation, is affected by the relative size of the groups. 
We conduct an experimental test of the model and find that observed laboratory 
behavior corresponds well with the game-theoretic comparative-static predictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1996, a conflict emerged between Watauga County, NC, and its county seat, the 
Town of Boone, over the cost of an environmental cleanup. The problem arose when 
inspectors found the county landfill was leaking cancer-causing pollutants into nearby 
wells, and mandated its closure at an expected cost of $2.6 million. Though owned by 
Watauga County at the time contaminants were discovered, Boone had operated the 
landfill for over 30 years before the county assumed control in 1985. Furthermore, the 
town remained a heavy user of the landfill after control was given to the county. 
Breakdown of negotiations led to a federal lawsuit under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act—i.e., Superfund. The irony of 
the conflict is that town residents, who comprise about 35% of the county’s 42,000 
residents, supported both sides of the contest with their tax revenue while anticipating 
they would bear some of the financial responsibility regardless of the outcome. 
 
The theory of rent-seeking provides insights on the economic consequences of   
individuals or groups competing with one another to win a rent. Pioneered by Tullock 
(1967, 1980), the theory suggests that efforts to secure a rent, such as lobbying, 
litigation, and investigations, tend to be wasteful because they are redistributive rather 
than productive.2 Katz, Nitzan, and Rosenberg (1990) and Ursprung (1990) extended 
the theory to explore collective rent-seeking, i.e., contests between groups of 
individuals, in which individuals decide the extent of participation in the groups’ efforts. 
Subsequent work on collective rent-seeking has extended the investigation in various 
directions, such as characteristics of group sharing rules (Lee 1993; Nitzan 1991), intra-
group mobility (Baik and Lee 1997, 2001), the rent being a pure public good (Baik 1993; 
Riaz et al. 1995), or some mixture of a public-private good (Esteban and Ray 2001). 
Previous research, however, has focused on variants of contests involving two 
independent groups and has yet to consider contests between interdependent groups 
(i.e., a group and a subset of itself). Such internal conflicts are not uncommon. 
Examples of internal conflicts include a $268+ million conflict between California and a 
group of 14 California cities over the responsibility of contamination at the Monterey 
Park Landfill; a recent legal battle between California and San Francisco over same-sex 
marriage laws; and more generally, a college competing with one of its departments to 
secure resources from the university administration.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to extend the collective rent-seeking literature by 
introducing the possibility that competing groups may be interdependent. We develop a 
model of conflict between nonautonomous groups and find that strategic individual 
behavior, and the resulting rent dissipation, is affected by the relative size of the groups. 
We visit the lab to test the model and find that observed laboratory behavior 
corresponds well with the comparative statics predicted by theory. While previous 
experimental studies have explored contests between individuals, we provide the first 
laboratory investigation of contests between groups, allowing us to incorporate the 
effect of intra-group dynamics on behavior. We find greater levels of cooperation than 
theory predicts—a result consistent with the experimental evidence on social dilemmas.  
 
 
II. THEORETICAL MODEL 
Following the collective rent-seeking literature (e.g., Baik 1994; Lee 1995; Nitzan 1991), 
consider a conflict between two groups, in which the groups compete for a fixed prize, 
which is a pure private good that can be divided among group members. Assume for 
simplicity that the entire prize goes to the victorious group and will be subject to a 
sharing rule wherein each member of the victorious group receives an equal share of 
the prize. Knowing this, group members voluntarily and individually decide the level of 
effort spent in the conflict. We extend this now by considering the conflict is between a 
group and a subset of that group.  
 
For conceptual ease, define the competing group and subset of that group respectively 
as county and town. Those county members that are not part of the town are defined as 
rural. Let the population of the county be m and the population of the town be n, and 
necessarily m ≥ n, with no inter-group mobility. Therefore, the rural population is (m − n) 
and the relative size of the town to county is (φ = n/m). A conflict, between county and 
town, erupts over an exogenous prize, g, (e.g., the avoided cost of environmental 
cleanup). Individuals may exert costly effort to influence the outcome of the conflict. 
Assuming individuals exert effort for one side of the conflict, we stratify individual effort 
by town and rural membership. Let individual effort of each town member be xt i where i 
= {1, . . . , n} and that of each rural member be xr j where j = {1, . . .,m − n}. Individuals 
are identical, and thus we refer to the individual efforts of representative town and rural 
members as xt and xr , respectively. Total group effort, town and rural, is the sum of 
individual members’ effort and denoted as Xt for town and Xr for rural. 
 
Group payoffs are dictated by one of two possible outcomes of the conflict—county wins 
or town wins. When either group wins, it avoids some or all of the cleanup costs and the 
other group pays the remaining bill with the intragroup sharing rule exogenously set at 
sharing costs equally among members of the liable group. Again, stratifying by town and 
nontown (rural) membership, the town pays g if the county wins, while the rural group 
pays 0. If the town wins, the town and rural groups pay in proportion to their sizes—the 
town paying n(g/m) and the rural group paying (m − n)(g/m). Individually, if the county 
wins, town members pay g/n and rural members pay 0. If the town wins, all members of 
the county (town and rural) pay g/m. Let pt(Xt,Xr ) represent the probability of success 
for the town, with pr(Xt,Xr ) representing that for the rural group. Following the contest 
literature, assume a logit functional form for the group probability functions (see Dixit 
1987; Tullock 1980). The logit contest-success function captures the dynamic that 
relative effort influences the likelihood of winning. The probabilities for success are: 
 
(1)    
 
We now explore equilibrium effort levels in this internal conflict. At the level of the 
individual, the expected cost of the ith member of town is 
(2)    
 
and the corresponding expected costs to the jth member of the rural group is  
 
(3)    
 
Individuals are identical, risk neutral, and select effort levels to minimize their 
corresponding objective functions. The first order conditions provide reaction functions 
for the individuals of each competing group, by which we solve for two equilibria. First, 
to establish a baseline, we solve a within-group cooperative equilibrium that represents 
an individual’s contribution to the best response of their group to the actions of the other 
group, which is akin to members cooperating—voluntarily or through the coercion of a 
benevolent planner—to achieve the group’s best response. Next, we solve a 
noncooperative Nash equilibrium that represents an individual’s self-interested 
contribution to the group, which allows individuals to free-ride on their fellow member 
contributions. The two solutions indicate the role of free-riding in the conflict, which 
is later tested in the lab. 
 
A. Cooperative 
The cooperative individual reaction functions are calculated from Equations (2) and (3) 
by determining the best response by the representative member of a cooperative group 
taking the actions of the opposing group members as given. That is, the town members 
act as a singleton and choose Xt to minimize nct i given the effort level of the rural 
group. Likewise, the rural group chooses Xr to minimize (m − n)cr i given the effort level 
of the town. Because the members are identical, the total effort is divided symmetrically 
by each group. Therefore, the cooperative reaction function of a town’s member, given 
a positive effort no greater than the cost of the cleanup is 
 
(4)    
 
and the cooperative reaction function of a rural group member, given a positive effort no 
greater than the cost of the cleanup is 
 
(5)    
Solving for the equilibrium provides the expected expenditure of each individual in the  
 
FIGURE 1 Cooperative Individual Reaction Functions 
 
 
conflict when group members are cooperating (voluntarily or not) to act on behalf of 
their group. With each individual symmetrically and simultaneously minimizing their 
group’s expected costs with effort levels, cleanup costs, and relative populations being 
common knowledge, we have the following cooperative equilibrium: 
 
(6)    
 
Figure 1 illustrates the individual reaction functions and the corresponding cooperative 
equilibria, for given levels of n relative to m. The population of the county is normalized 
to unity such that relative populations are described solely by n. Equilibria are 
characterized by the intersection of the reaction functions at each level of n (the specific 
values of n displayed are arbitrarily chosen at 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75). 
 
B. Noncooperative 
The noncooperative individual reaction functions are calculated from Equations (2) and 
(3) by determining the best response of an individual group member taking the actions 
of other members in her group and all members in the opposing group as given. Again, 
individuals are symmetric so group members will behave the same. The noncooperative 
reaction function of the town’s representative member and the rural group’s 
representative member, given a positive effort no greater than the cost of the cleanup, 
is: 
 
(7)    
 
(8)    
 
Solving for the noncooperative Nash equilibrium provides the expected expenditure of 
each individual without the presence of voluntary or coerced cooperation. With each 
individual simultaneously minimizing their own expected costs with effort levels, cleanup 
costs, and relative populations being common knowledge, we have the following 
noncooperative Nash equilibrium:  
 
(9)    
 
Figure 2 depicts the noncooperative reaction functions and the individual Nash 
equilibria, for given levels of n relative to m. As in Figure 1, the population of the county 
is normalized to unity such that relative populations are described solely by n, and 
equilibria for specific values of n are provided. Theory provides hypotheses on how the 
relative size of the internal group affects effort in internal conflicts. For the cooperative 
case, Figure 3 depicts relationship between effort levels and the relative size of the 
internal group respective to the overall group size. As illustrated, effort by an internal 
group member is 
 
FIGURE 2 Noncooperative Individual Reaction Functions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3 Cooperative Individual Effort Levels and Relative Group Size 
 
 
negatively related to the relative size of the internal group,10 and the effort by an 
external member is invariant to the relative size of the internal group. Thus we have two 
cooperative research hypotheses: 
 
• Cooperative Internal Hypothesis: Individual effort by internal group (town) members 
declines with relative increases in the internal group size. 
 
• Cooperative External Hypothesis: Individual effort of those outside the internal group 
(rural) is invariant to relative increases in the internal group size. 
 
Turning to the noncooperative case, Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between effort 
levels and the relative size of the internal group respective to the overall group size. As 
in the cooperative case, effort by an internal group member remains negatively related 
to the relative size of the internal group,11 though the noncooperative Nash equilibrium 
predicts lower absolute effort  
 
FIGURE 4 Noncooperative Individual Effort Levels and Relative Group Size 
 
levels across the board due to the presence of free-riding. Unlike the cooperative case, 
effort by an external member is positively related to the relative size of the internal 
group. Thus we have the following two noncooperative research hypotheses: 
 
• Noncooperative Internal Hypothesis: Individual effort by internal group (town) 
members declines with relative increases in the internal group size. 
 
• Noncooperative External Hypothesis: Individual effort of those outside the internal 
group (rural) increases with relative increases in the relative size of the internal group 
size. 
 
Figure 5 illustrates how relative group size affects total effort. In both cooperative and 
noncooperative cases, total effort is inversely related to the relative size of the internal 
group. Further, the presence of within-group strategic behavior in the noncooperative 
equilibrium causes total effort to be lower in the noncooperative case across all levels of 
the internal group’s relative size. 
 
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate student body at a large public 
university to participate in a computerized contest game.  
 
FIGURE 5 Total Effort Levels and Relative Group Size 
 
 
After entering the lab, participants signed a consent form acknowledging their voluntary 
participation while agreeing to abide by the instructions. All subjects were unfamiliar 
with contest games, and written protocols ensured uniformity in procedures. 
 
A. Basics 
We conducted three treatments, each consisting of two sessions. In each session, 16 
subjects were randomly placed in groups of four (m = 4). Group members were not 
identified to one another, and communication was not allowed among subjects. A 
monitor read the experimental instructions aloud while the subjects followed along with 
individual copies. The instructions concluded with a series of questions and answers 
that reinforced subject understanding.  After being endowed with 25 tokens, group 
members contended for a prize of 80 tokens (g = 80). 
 
The probability function of a group winning the contest, pt and pr was common 
knowledge, and equaled the ratio of the group’s effort to total effort expended by all 
groups. Individual member contributions to group effort, xi and xj , were costly—one 
token paid for one unit of effort. Using their endowment, subjects simultaneously chose 
how much effort to contribute to their group’s effort. Group effort, Xt and Xr , the total 
effort contributed by members, was announced, along with the resulting probabilities for 
each group winning the prize. A random draw determined the winner, and individual 
payoffs were announced and recorded. Subsequent rounds followed with a new 
endowment and contest, with a total of 20 rounds. Groups were randomly reassigned 
after each round to minimize reputation effects. This, along with subject anonymity and 
no communication, minimizes the likelihood of coordination and cooperation and 
supports the prospects for observing individual Nash behavior. After the final round, 
subjects received their earnings in cash and in private, and left the lab one-by-one 
without any discussion. 
 
B. Treatments 
The experimental design involves three treatments, each varying by the size of the 
subgroup (φ = n/m). We vary n, while all other parameters remain constant (m = 4, g = 
80, p(•)), and we observe individual and group effort. In each treatment, each group of 
four contends with a subset of itself with the size of the subset varying across 
treatments; φ = 0.25, 0.50, or 0.75.13 
 
C. Predictions and Hypotheses 
Using the cooperative equilibrium expressed in Equation (6), we identify the 
theoretically predicted individual effort by town members (i.e., internal group members) 
as: 15 tokens when φ = 0.25; 5 tokens when φ = 0.50; and 1.67 tokens when φ = 0.75. 
Predicted individual effort by those outside the subgroup, or rural members, is 5 tokens 
in all treatments. Using the noncooperative Nash equilibrium expressed in Equation (9), 
we identify the theoretically predicted individual effort by town members (i.e., internal 
group members) as: 11.25 tokens when φ = 0.25; 2.5 tokens when φ = 0.50; and 0.417 
tokens when φ = 0.75. Predicted individual effort by rural members is: 1.25 tokens when 
φ = 0.25; 2.5 tokens when φ = 0.50; and 3.75 tokens when φ = 0.75. Note the specific 
predictions correspond to the previously presented research hypotheses. 
 
IV. RESULTS 
Table 1 provides the mean individual effort levels for town and rural group members in 
each treatment, along with a summary of the cooperative and noncooperative 
predictions given the experimental parameters. Table 1 also reports the predicted and 
observed relative effort levels, which are defined as the difference between the mean 
effort expended by the town and rural members (e.g., a difference of zero indicates 
symmetric effort). 
 
Results from the lab provide strong support for the noncooperative research 
hypotheses.  As the relative size of the internal group increased, the effort expended by 
town members declined and the effort expended by rural members increased. 
Specifically, when the internal group was 25, 50, and 75% of the overall group, the 
internal group members (town) spent 13.86, 6.18, and 4.88 units of effort and those 
outside the internal group (rural) spent 3.61, 7.97, and 9.48 units. These results hold if 
we consider all 20 rounds or only the final five rounds of the session. 
 
Reviewing the numbers in Table 1 more closely reveals a close correspondence 
between observed mean effort levels and the specific game-theoretic predictions. In 
treatment one (φ = 0.25), mean effort by town and rural members fell between the 
cooperative and noncooperative predictions, but over time, effort declined and 
approached the noncooperative predictions. In the final five rounds, town and rural 
members contributed 11.55 and 2.60 units of effort, which correspond closely to the 
noncooperative predictions of 11.25 and 1.25 units. With the parameters of treatment 
one, theory predicts asymmetric effort by town and rural members with a town member 
expending 10.0 more units of effort than a rural member. Actual numbers match up 
extremely well, with town members’ mean contribution being 10.25 more than that of 
rural members. 
 
Predictions in treatment two (φ = 0.50) call for symmetric effort by town and rural 
members −5.0 units in the cooperative solution and 2.5 units in the noncooperative 
solution. Mean individual effort levels observed in the lab were 6.18 and 7.97 for town 
and rural members, but fell to 5.60 and 6.23 units in the final five rounds. Subjects 
appear to be exhibiting less free-riding than predicted by theory. Results concerning 
relative effort levels are consistent with the symmetric prediction—the difference in 
mean effort by town and rural members is 1.79 over all rounds, and this difference falls 
to 0.62 in the final five rounds. 
 
Observed effort levels in treatment three (φ = 0.75) are consistently above the 
cooperative (and noncooperative) predictions, even in the latter rounds. Actual 
individual effort levels for town and rural members were 4.88 and 9.48 units across all 
rounds, consistently greater than 
 
TABLE 1 Predicted and Observed Individual Effort Levels by Group 
 
 
the cooperative predictions of 1.67 and 5.0 units and the noncooperative predictions of 
0.42 and 3.75 units. Though effort being above predicted levels is common is the 
experimental literature (Onculer and Croson 2005), we suspect the inflated effort levels 
observed in treatment three is largely due to boundary effects (e.g., Andreoni 1995; 
Chan et al. 1994). Thus, relative effort levels may be more instructive.14 We expect, 
according to theory, a town member will contribute 3.33 fewer units of effort than a rural 
member. We observe that town members contributed 4.60 less. 
 
We turn to a conditional analysis of individual effort levels to confirm these initial 
impressions. Table 2 reports the results from the following empirical model: 
 
(10)    
 
where the dependent variable, Ei , denotes the ith subject’s effort level toward the 
conflict in period t , θi is a vector of binary variables signifying the size of the internal 
group of subject i’s conflict (φ = 0.50 or 0.75; φ = 0.25 omitted); ωi is a vector of 
interaction variables that captures the relative effect of internal group size on internal 
group members, ψt is a set of T – 1 dummies that capture potential nonlinear period 
effects; ui are random effects which control for unobservable individual characteristics; α 
is the constant term; and εit is the contemporaneous additive error term. 
 
Table 2 reports the results from three models: a pooled model using the full model 
described in Equation (10), and two reduced models using stratified data according to 
group membership (town and rural). The conditional estimates confirm our initial 
impressions that the experimental investigation provides strong support for the 
noncooperative research hypotheses. From the town model, results indicate that the 
effort expended by internal group members is negatively related to the size of the  
 
TABLE 2 Results from Panel Estimation of Treatment Effects 
 
 
internal group, which is consistent with both the cooperative and noncooperative 
internal hypotheses. Estimated coefficients indicate that effort by an internal group 
member decreases 7.68 units as the relative size of the internal group increases from 
25 to 50% (p = 0.027), and decreases 8.98 units as the relative size increases from 25 
to 75% (p = 0.006). These estimated treatment effects correspond well to the 
noncooperative game-theoretic predictions of 9.75 and 10.83 units. 
 
Results from the rural model find that the effort levels of those outside the internal group 
are positively related to the relative size of the internal group, which is consistent with 
the noncooperative external hypothesis and inconsistent with the cooperative external 
member hypothesis. Estimates suggest that effort by those outside the internal group 
increases 4.36 units as the relative size of the internal group increases from 25 to 50% 
(p = 0.030), and increases 5.86 units as the relative size increases from 25 to 75% (p = 
0.021). The estimated treatment effects are larger than predicted (1.25 and 2.5 units), 
and we suspect this finding is related to observed effort being inflated by a boundary 
effect. Results from the pooled model suggest this may be the case. 
 
As illustrated in Table 2, the conditional estimates from the pooled model show the 
game-theoretic predictions are extremely accurate in describing relative behavior 
between competing members. The coefficients associated with the interaction vector 
reveal the estimated difference in effort between town and rural members conditioned 
on treatment effects and unobserved subject and period effects, and these differences 
closely match predicted behavior across all treatments. In treatment two (φ = 0.50), 
estimates indicate town members contributed 10.25 more units of effort than rural 
members (p = 0.000), which matches the prediction of 10 units. Also consistent with 
theory, in treatment three (φ = 0.75), estimates find statistically equivalent, i.e., 
symmetric, effort by town and rural members (p = 0.459). And while marginal in 
significance, estimates concerning treatment four (φ = 0.75) indicate town members 
contributed 4.60 fewer units of effort than rural members (p = 0.116), which corresponds 
well to the predicted 3.33 units. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Conflicts often arise between two interdependent groups, in which one group competes 
with a subset of itself (e.g., a conflict between a town and county over environmental 
cleanup costs). This paper extends the literature on collective rent-seeking to consider 
the possibility of this type of conflict. Theory suggests that rent dissipation decreases as 
the relative size of the internal group increases, and that members of the internal group 
respond differently to the presence of an internal conflict than those outside the internal 
group. The Nash equilibrium effort level expended by members of the subgroup is 
inversely related to the relative size of the subgroup, while the equilibrium effort 
expended by those outside the subgroup depends on the presence of within-group 
cooperation. If members cooperate on behalf of the group, effort by those outside the 
internal group is unaffected by the relative size of the internal group. Without 
cooperation (i.e., free-riding), effort by members outside the internal group is positively 
related to the size of the internal group increases. 
 
Exploring the theoretical predictions in the lab, we find the Nash equilibrium concept is a 
strong predictor of observed behavior in a setting of internal conflicts. Experimental 
results support the general hypotheses arising from theory, particularly the 
noncooperative Nash solutions. As the relative size of the internal group increased, 
members of the internal group decreased contributions of effort and members outside 
the internal group increased effort. 
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